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Ethical Reflections o n C y b e r s t a l k i n g

Frances S. Grodzinsky and Herman I Tavani

This essay examines some ethical aspects of stalking behavior in cyberspace. We
have argued elsewhere that recent online stalking incidents raise a wide range of
ethical concerns, including issues affecting gender (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001),
personal privacy (Tavani and Grodzinsky, 2002), and physical vs. virtual harm
(Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2002). The primary axis of discussion in this essay has to
do with implications that cyberstalking has for our notion of moral responsibility,
both at the collective (or group) and individual levels. For example, do collectivities and organizations such as Internet service providers (ISPs) have any moral obligations to cyberstalking victims, which go beyond legal obligations covered in strict
liability law? And do ordinary Internet users have a moral obligation to inform (and
possibly also to assist) persons whom they discover to be the targets of online stalkers? In our analysis of these questions, particular attention is paid to a cyberstalking incident involving Amy Boyer.
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n : - S t a l k i n g I n c i d e n t s i n C y b e r s p a c e
What is cyberstalking? And how do stalking incidents in cyberspace raise ethical concerns? In answering these questions, we begin with a definition of stalking in general. According to Webster's Neiu World Dictionary of the American Language, to engage
in stalking is "to pursue or approach game, an enemy, etc. stealthily, as from cover."
In the context of criminal activities involving human beings, a stalking crime is generally considered to be one in which an individual ("the stalker") clandestinely tracks
the movements of another individual or individuals ("the stalkeefs]"). Cyberstalking
can be understood as a form of behavior in which certain types of stalking-related
activities, which in the past have occurred in physical space, are extended to the online
world. We should note, however, that criteria used in determining which kinds of
behavior should count as stalking crimes in the physical realm has been neither consistent nor clear. Hence, it also has been more difficult to determine what the criteria should be for a determining a stalking crime in the cyber-realm.
One difficulty in understanding some of the essential features of cyberstalking
crimes is that they sometimes border on, and thus become confused with, broader
forms of "harassment crimes" in cyberspace. Consider a recent incident involving
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twenty-year old Christian Hunold, who was charged with terrorizing Timothy
McGillicuddy, a high school principal in the state of Massachusetts. Hunold constructed a Web site that included "hit lists" of teachers and students at that
Massachusetts school, on which he also included a picture of the school that was
displayed through "the cross hairs of arifle."Using various pseudonyms, Hunold
corresponded with several eighth graders in the school. He then made specific
threats to these Massachusetts students, who had no idea.that they were communicating with a person who lived in Missouri ("The Web's Dark Side," 2000).
Should this particular criminal incident be viewed as a case of cyberstalking? Or is
it better understood under a different description such as "cyber-harassment?"
A criminal incident involving Randi Barber and Gary Dellapenta is sometimes
also included under the category of cyberstalking. In 1996, Barber met Dellapenta,
a security guard, through a friend. Although Dellapenta wanted a relationship with
Barber, she spumed his advances. A few months later, Barber began to receive telephone solicitations from men; and in one instance, a "solicitor" actually appeared
at the door of her residence. Barber seemed to be unaware of how potentially dangerous her situation had become. For example, she had no idea that Dellapenta
had assumed her identity in various Internet chat rooms, when soliciting "kinky
sex." Anonymity and pseudonymity tools, available to any Internet user, allowed
Dellapenta to represent himself as Barber, via screen names such as a "playfulkitty4UM
and "kinkygal30." Barber became aware of what was going on only after she asked
one caller why he was phoning her (Foote, 1999). Note that in this alleged case of
cyberstalking, Dellapenta engaged others to stalk his intended victim in physical
space. So once again, we can ask whether the Barber/Dellapenta incident is a genuine case of cyberstalking or whether it can be more appropriately described as an
instance of a harassment involving the use of Internet technology.
Thus far we have briefly described two different criminal incidents that some
authors have referred to as examples of cyberstalking. It is perhaps worth noting
that no physical harm resulted to victims in either incident; and in both cases, it
was difficult to separate certain harassment activities (in general) from stalking
behavior in particular. Also, in the Barbar/Dellapenta case, the staiking-related
activities involved both physical space and cyberspace. We next examine a stalking
incident involving Amy Boyer, which we believe is a clearer case of cyberstalking.
2. T h e A m y Boyer C y b e r s t a l k i n g C a s e
On October 15,1999, Amy Boyer, a twenty-year-old resident of Nashua, NH, was murdered by a young man who had stalked her via the Internet. Her stalker, Liam
Youens, was able to carry out most of the stalking activities that eventually led to
Boyer's death by using a variety of online tools available to any Internet user.
Through the use of online search facilities, for example, Youens was able to find
out where Boyer lived, where she worked, what kind of vehicle she drove, and so
forth. Youens was also able to use other kinds of online tools, typically provided by
Internet service providers (ISPs), to construct two Web sites. On one site, he posted
personal information about Boyer, including a picture of her; and on another site,
Youens described, in explicit detail, his plans to murder Boyer.
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The Amy Boyer case raises several ethical and social questions, independent of
the important fact that the stalking behavior in this incident eventually led to Boyer's
death. For example, some have argued that Boyer's privacy was violated. We could
ask whether Boyer was a victim of online defamation. We could also ask whether
Youens had a right to post information about Boyer on his Web site, and whether
such a "right" is one that ought to be protected by free speech. Or should such
"speech" be controlled in cyberspace? Also, we could ask whether issues raised in
the Boyer case are more ethically significant than those in other online stalking incidents because of the physical harm caused to Boyer, resulting in her death. Although
the Amy Boyer case raises several ethical issues, we can ask whether there is anything unique or even special about these issues from a moral point of view.
3. W h a t , if A n y t h i n g , Is Ethically S i g n i f i c a n t A b o u t
Cyberstalking Crimes?
From an ethical perspective, an interesting question is whether there is anything
unique or even special about the Amy Boyer case in particular, or cyberstalking in
general. On the one hand, we do not claim that cyberstalking is a new kind of crime;
nor, for that matter, do we argue that cyberstalking is a "genuine" computer crime
fTavani, 2000). Yet can we reasonably ask whether Internet technology has made a
relevant difference in the stalking case involving Amy Boyer? Perhaps the more important question, however, is: Has cybertechnology made a moral difference? One
might be inclined to answer no. For example, one could argue that "murder is murder," and that whether a murderer uses a computing device that included Internet
tools to assist in carrying out a particular murder is irrelevant from an ethical point
of view. One could further argue that there is nothing special about cyberstalking
incidents in general—irrespective of whether or not those incidents result in the
death of the victims—since stalking activities have had a long history of occurrence
in the "off-line" world. According to this line of reasoning, the use of Internet technology could be seen as simply the latest in a series of tools or techniques that have
become available to stalkers to assist them in carrying out their criminal activities.
However, it could also be argued that the Internet has made a relevant difference with respect to stalking-related crimes because of the ways in which stalking activities can now be carried out. For example, Internet stalkers can operate
anonymously or pseudononyrhously while online. Also consider that a cyberstalker
can stalk one or more individuals from the comfort of his or her home, and thus
does not have to venture out into the physical world to stalk someone. So Internet
technology has provided stalkers with a certain mode of stalking that was not possible in the pre-Internet era.
It could also be argued that cyberstalking has made possible certain kinds of
behavior that challenge our conventional moral and legal frameworks. These challenges have to do primarily with issues of scale and scope. For example, a cyberstalker
can stalk multiple victims simultaneously through the use of multiple "windows"
on his or her computer. The stalker can also stalk victims who happen to live in
states and countries that are geographically distant from the stalker. So, potentially
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both the number of stalking incidents and the range of- stalking activities can
increase dramatically because of the Internet (Tavani, 2002). However, we leave open
the question whether any of these matters make a moral difference.
In the remainder of this essay, we focus on two questions involving issues of
moral responsibility in.the Boyer case: (1) Should the two ISPs that permitted
Youens to post information about Amy Boyer on Web sites that reside in their
Internet "space" be held morally accountable? (2) Do ordinary users who happen
to come across a Web site that contains a posting of a death threat directed at an
individual (or group of individuals) have a moral responsibility to inform those individuals whose lives are threatened?
4. Moral Responsibility a n d Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
As noted above, Youens set up two Web sites about Amy Boyer: one containing
descriptive information about Boyer, as well as a photograph of her, and another on
which he described in detail his plans to murder Boyer. To what extent, if any—either
legally or morally, or both—should the ISPs that hosted the Web sites created by
Youens be held responsible? Because this question is very complex, it would be beneficial to break it down into several shorter questions. For example, we first need to
understand what is meant by "responsibility" in both its legal and moral senses. We
also have to consider whether we can attribute moral blame (or praise) to an organization or collectivity (i.e., a group of individuals), such as an ISP. We begin by briefly
examining some recent laws and court challenges that either directly or indirecdy
pertain to questions involving responsibility and liability for ISPs.
In Stratton Oafemont v. Prodigy Services Company (1995), the court determined that
Prodigy could be held legally liable since it had advertised that it had "editorial control" over the content in the computer bulletin board system (BBS) it hosted. In the
eyes of the court, Prodigy's claim to have editorial control over its BBS made that
ISP seem similar to a newspaper, in which case the standard of strict legal liability
used for original publishers could be applied. In response to the decision in the Prodigy
case, many ISPs have since argued that they should not be understood as "original
publishers," but rather as "common carriers," similar in relevant respects to telephone
companies. Their argument for this view rested in part on the notion that ISPs provide the "conduits for communication but not the content"This view of ISPs would
be used in later court decisions (such as Zeran v. America Online Inc. 1997).
In Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the function of ISPs
was interpreted in such a way that would appear to protect them from lawsuits
similar to the one filed against Prodigy. Here the court specifically stated, "No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."
Although the U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down CDA, Section 230 of that
Act has remained intact. While ISPs are not legally liable for the content of their
Web sites or for the content of other electronic forums that they also might host—
e.g., forums such as bulletin boards, chat rooms, and list servers—they have
nonetheless been encouraged to monitor and filter, to the extent that they can, the
content of these electronic forums. But this has presented ISPs with a thorny legal
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problem. Consider, for example, that the more an ISP edits content, the more it
becomes like a publisher (such as a newspaper). And the more it becomes like a
publisher, with editorial control, the more liable an ISP becomes from a legal perspective. So, effectively, there could be some disincentive for ISPs to monitor and
filter content. This, in turn, raises a moral dilemma for ISPs.
Should Internet Service Providers be held morally accountable for objectionable
behavior that occurs in their forums? Deborah Johnson (2001) notes that while it
might be easier to make a utilitarian case for holding ISPs legally liable in certain
instances, it would be much more difficult to make the case that ISPs should be
morally responsible for the behavior of their customers. Recently, however, Richard
Spinello (2001) and Anton Vedder (2001) have tried to show, via very different kinds
of arguments, why ISPs also should be held morally accountable to some extent.
Neither Spinello nor Vedder address the issue of cyberstalking per se; however, we
believe that Spinello's remarks regarding "on-line/lefamation" and Vedders's comments regarding on-line "harm," both of which are associated with ISPs, can help
shed some light on the. question before us. We briefly examine both arguments.
4.1 ISP Accountability. The Spinello View
Arguing that ISPs should be held morally accountable in cases involving defamation,
Spinellofirstdistinguishes between "moral responsibility" and "moral accountability." In making this distinction, he uses a model advanced by Helen Nissenbaum (1994).
According to Nissenbaum's scheme, accountability, unlike responsibility, does not
require causality or a causal connection. Spinello points out that because ISPs do not
cause defamation, they cannot be held responsible in the strict or narrow arrow
sense of the term. However, he argues that they could, nonetheless, be held accountable—i.e., "answerable"—in the sense that they "provide an occasion or forum" for
defamation. Spinello is careful to point out that simply because an ISP presents an
"occasion for defamation," it does not necessarily follow that an ISP is accountable.
Rather, for an ISP to be accountable, two further conditions are required: (a) the ISP
must also have some capability to do something about the defamation, and (b) the
ISP failed to take action once it had been informed. Spinello believes that this standard of accountability takes into consideration what ISPs can reasonably do—i.e., what
they are capable of doing—to prevent defamation or at least to limit its damage. So
the fact that an ISP might not have caused the defamation does not rule out the possibility that the ISP can be held accountable in some sense for defamatory remarks.
Spinello concedes that technical and economic factors make it virtually impossible for ISPs to take preventative, or what he calls "pre-screening," measures that
would detect or filter out defamatory messages.Thus we cannot hold ISPs responsible in a causal sense for defamation. Assuming that Spinello's overall argument
is correct, however, we might hold ISPs accountable if they fail to take certain
actions once they are informed that a victim has been defamed. For Spinello, these
steps would include three actions: (i) prompt removal of the defamatory remarks;
(ii) the issuance of a retraction on behalf of the victim; and (iii) the initiation
of a good faith effort to track down the originator so that the defamation does
not reoccur.
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Does this threefold requirement provide us with a standard of accountability that
is a "reasonable middle ground," as Spinello suggests? Or is it an unreasonable expectation for ISPs? Spinello notes that in the current system, a victim of defamation has
no legal recourse because of the absolute immunity given to ISPs. On the other hand,
the strict legal liability that was applied in the Prodigy case seems unduly harsh for
ISPs. So Spinello believes that his alternative scheme provides the appropriate middle ground needed, because it grants some protection to victims of defamation without burdening the ISP. So even if the law does not require ISPs to take any action, Spinello
believes that "post-screening" in a "diligent fashion" for content along the lines of the
threefold criteria described above is the morallyrightthing to do. He concedes, however, that ISPs do not have the capability to "pre-screen" content for defamation.
4.2 ISP: Accountability: The Vedder Argument
Anton Vedder (2001) has recently advanced a very different kind of argument for
why we should consider holding ISPs morally responsible for harm caused to individuals. Vedder suggests that we begin by drawing an important distinction between
two senses of moral responsibility: prospective and retrospective responsibility.
Whereas retrospective responsibility tends to be "backward looking," prospective
responsibility is "forward looking." Vedder believes that in the past, arguments
that have been used to ascribe legal liability to ISPs have tended to be prospective
in nature. This is because the primary objective of liability laws has been to deter
future on-line abuses rather than punish past offenses.
Vedder also notes that even though ISPs are not legally liable for their content
under current U.S. law, the mere threat of legal liability can be used to deter ISPs
from becoming lax about "policing" their electronic forums to some reasonable
extent. So underlying the reasoning for arguments for applying strict legal liability to ISPs is the utilitarian principle that having liability laws in place will deter
harm to ISP users in the future. And this legal argument, in turn, is based on a notion
of moral responsibility that is essentially prospective in nature. Vedder also points
out that we are hesitant to attribute a retrospective sense of responsibility to ISPs
because this sense of moral responsibility:
(A) is usually applied to individuals (as opposed to organizations or what he calls
"collectivities"), and
(B) it also often implies guilt.
And as Vedder correctly notes, the notion of guilt is typically attributed to individuals
and not to organizations or collectivities. He suggests, however, that in some cases it
also makes sense to attribute the notion of guilt to a collectivity such as an ISP.
Attributing some moral accountability to ISPs makes sense, in Vedder's scheme,
because of the connection that exists between retrospective and prospective responsibility. Vedder argues that it makes no sense to hold an agent (i.e., either an individual or a collectivity) responsible for an act in a prospective sense if that agent
could not also be held responsible for the act in a retrospective sense as well. So
Vedder concludes that if we assume that collectivities such as ISPs can be held
responsible in a prospective sense— a rationale that has been used as the basis for
utilitarian arguments in attributing legal liability for ISPs—then we can also ascribe
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retrospective responsibility to ISPs. So, as in the case of Spinello, Vedder believes
that ISPs can be held morally accountable to some extent for speech that is communicated in their electronic forums.
4.3 Some Implications for ISP Accountability in the Amy Boyer Case
We can now apply Vedder's and Spinello's arguments to the Amy Boyer cyberstalking case. Should Tripod and Geocities, the two ISPs that enabled Liam Youens
to set up his Web sites about Boyer, be held morally accountable for the harm
caused to Boyer and to her family? And'should those two ISPs be held morally
accountable, even if they were not responsible (in the narrow sense) for causing
harm to Boyer and even if they can be exonerated from charges of strict legal liability? If the arguments by Vedder and Spinello succeed, then it is reasonable to
hold these ISPs morally accountable if it also could be shown that Tripod and
Geocities were capable of limiting the harm that resulted to Boyer. (Tim Remsberg,
Amy Boyer's stepfather, has recently filed a wrongful death suit against both ISPs.)
Of course, one might ask what the purpose would be in attributing moral responsibility to ISPs if no legal action could be taken against them. At least two different replies are possible to this question, both of which might also cause us to be
more careful in our thinking about moral issues involving cyberspace. First, an analysis of moral issues in this light could help us to distinguish further between moral
and legal aspects of controversial cyberspace issues. Second, such an analysis can
also help to consider some ways in which moral responsibility can be applied at
the collective, as well as at the individual, level.
5. Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d Ordinary I n t e r n e t U s e r s
We next examine questions of moral responsibility that apply at the individual
level, i.e., at the level of individual users in online communities. For example, do
ordinary Internet users have a moral responsibility to inform "would-be victims"
of their imminent danger to online stalkers? If an Internet user had been aware of
Boyer's situation, should that user have notified Boyer that she was being stalked?
In other words, should that user be morally obligated to do so?
Various proposals for controlling individual behavior in online communities have
resulted in a conflict between those who wish to regulate strictly by law and those
who wish to preserve the practice of self-regulation. Of course, this dispute is
sometimes also at the base of arguments involving claims having to do with a "safe"
social space vs. a "restrictive'' one. In the case of cyberstalking, should we assist
others based strictly on formal legal regulations, or should we assist them because
it is the morally right thing to do?
5.1 A Minimalist Sense of Moral Obligation vs. an "Ethic of Care"
Some have argued that while morality can demand of an agent that he or she "do
no harm" to others, it cannot require that an agent actively "prevent harm," or "do
good." In one sense, to do no harm is to act in accordance with the rules of a moral
system. But is doing so always sufficient for complying with what is required of
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us as moral agents? In other words, if it is in our power to prevent harm and to do
good, should we do so? Some theoretical frameworks suggest that individuals
should prevent harm (and otherwise do good), whenever it is in their power to do
so. For example, if one believes, as some natural law theorists assert, that the purpose of morality is to alleviate human suffering and to promote human flourishing, whenever possible, then clearly we would seem obligated to prevent harm in
cyberspace. An interesting account of this view has been advanced by Louis Pojman
(2001). Unfortunately, we are not able to present Pojman's argument here in the
detail that.it deserves, since doing so would take us beyond the scope of this
paper. But we can see how, based on a modeflike Pojman's, one might develop a
fuller theory in which individuals have an obligation to "assist" others in the act
of preventing harm from coming to those persons.
We recognize the difficulties of defending a natural law theory; and we are not
prepared to do so here. However, we also believe that the kind of limited or moderate natural law theories that can be found in Pojman, and to some extent in James
Moor (1998), can be very useful in making the case for an extended sense of moral
obligation at the level of individuals.
Another moral framework that implies an expanded sense of moral responsibility on the part of individuals is the "ethic of care," introduced in a seminal work
by Carol Gilligan (1982). Complying with a "care ethic," individuals would assist one
another whenever it is in their power to do so. As such, an ethic based on care is
more robust than a mere "non-interference" notion of ethics that simply involves
"doing no harm to others"—i.e., it is concerned with a sense of commitment to others that Virginia Held (1995) describes as "above and beyond the floor of duty."
Gilligan's ethic of care has been contrasted with traditional ethical systems, such
as utilitarian and Kantian theories. Alison Adam (2000) points out that traditional
ethical theories are often based simply on following formal rules and that they tend
to engender a sense of individualism (as opposed to community). Adam (2001,2002)
has also argued that an ethic of care, in particular, and feminist ethical theory in
general, can help us to understand more clearly some of the social and ethical implications of cyberstalking behavior in ways that traditional ethical theories cannot.
Adopting an "ethic of care" in cyberspace would mean that individuals, i.e., ordinary Internet users, would be prone to assist others whenever they can help to prevent harm from coming to them. From this perspective, individuals would assist
one another, even though there may be no specific laws or rules that require them
to do so. In what sense would such an expectation on the part of individuals expand
our conventional notion of moral obligation?
5.2 Expanding the Sphere of Moral Responsibility: A Duty to Assist
Questions concerning whether individuals have a "duty to assist" others often
arise in the aftermath of highly publicized crimes such as the one involving the
Kitty Genovese case in 1964. Genovese, a young woman, was murdered on the street
outside her apartment building in Queens, New York, as thirty-eight of her neighbors
watched. None of her neighbors called the police during the 35-minute period of
repeated stabbings. Some have since referred to this refusal to assist a neighbor in
critical need as "the Genovese Syndrome." Several police officers interviewed in the
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aftermath of the Genovese incident believed that Genovese's neighbors who witnessed the attack were morally obligated to notify the police, even though there
may have been no formal law or specific statute requiring them to do so.
Drawing an analogy between the Genovese and Boyer cases, we can ask whether
users who might have been able to assist Boyer should have done so (i.e., whether
they were morally obligated to assist her). We can also ask what kind of community cyberspace will become, if people refuse to assist users who may be at risk to
predators and murderers. First, we need to consider the potential harm that could
come to members of the online community if we fail to act to prevent harm from
coming to those individuals, when it is in our power to help and when doing so
would neither cause us any great inconvenience nor put our safety at risk. What
would have happened to Randi Barber if no one had intervened in her behalf? In
the cyberstalking case involving Barber and Dellapenta, Barber's father, with the
cooperation of the men who were soliciting her/ provided evidence that led to
Dellapenta's arrest. In the case of Amy Boyer, however, the same sense of individual
moral responsibility and concern was not apparent. Consider that some Internet
users had, in fact, viewed the Youens' Web site but did not inform Boyer that she
was being stalked and that her life was in imminent danger. Like Kitty Genovese
who received no assistance from members of her physical community, Amy Boyer
received no assistance from members of the online community.
Because of what happened to Amy Boyer, and because of what could happen to
future victims of online stalking, we argue that ordinary users, as members of an
online community, should adopt a notion of moral responsibility that involves
assisting fellow users. Doing so would help to keep cyberspace a safer place for everyone, but especially for women and children who are particularly vulnerable to
stalking activities. Failing to embrace such a notion of moral responsibility, on the
other hand, could result in users disconnecting themselves from their responsibilities toward fellow human beings.
6. C o n c l u s i o n
We have examined some ethical concerns involving cyberstalking in general, and
the Amy Boyer case in particular. We saw that stalking activities in cyberspace raise
questions about the sphere of moral responsibility, both for ISPs and ordinary
Internet users. We argued that ISPs and individual users, each in different ways,
should assume some moral responsibility for helping to prevent harm from coming
to individuals targeted by cyberstalkers.
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